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Chapter 6
Too Much Risk to Insure? The Australian
(non-) Market for Annuities
Hazel Bateman and John Piggott
Products and policies which provide protection against longevity risk – the
risk that an individual might outlive his or her resources – are increasingly
important in an era characterized both by increased life expectancy and
increased uncertainty surrounding longevity. Yet the reality is that, as
privately managed defined contribution (DC) retirement saving gains
greater importance globally, both governments and the private sector are
retreating from the provision of longevity insurance. The lack of formal
structures and products offering such insurance does not mean that the
risk has decreased, even though its financial implications may not find
their way to the balance sheets of commercial or government institutions.
Rather, the absence of organized longevity insurance structures suggests
that when the outcomes are realized, the response will be arbitrary and
likely to be driven by political exigency. Rewards for careful planning on
the part of individuals, or of careful management by financial institutions,
may be compromised by short-term policy reaction to circumstances which,
in the large, can be anticipated now but for which current structures do not
encourage planning.
Nowhere is this more true than in Australia, where heavy reliance for
income replacement in retirement is placed on a mandatory DC structure,
administered through private institutions. Accumulations are available as
lump sums or income streams, free of any tax on withdrawal at age 60, and
the tax, social security, and regulatory framework make it easier and less
expensive to choose non-annuitized benefits.1 The demand for immediate
annuities, and particularly life annuities, in Australia has always been small
and incentives to take annuitized products, introduced in conjunction with
the private mandatory arrangements, have been gradually withdrawn. As a
result, the market for life annuities has virtually disappeared. In 2001, only
1,927 life annuities were sold in Australia. By 2009, this had fallen to fewer
than twenty.
While a relatively generous and widely accessed safety net exists, there
are therefore no structures in place in Australia to encourage or mandate
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income replacement accumulations to be taken as annuitized benefits.
Australia is the only country which relies predominantly on a mandatory
privately administered DC structure for income replacement, not to have
incentives or mandates in place for longevity insurance.
Nevertheless, there is cause for optimism, with some formative steps
toward a revitalized market for longevity insurance products. The Austra-
lian wealth management industry (AFTS 2009) is actively developing new
longevity products, while the government, in response to recent reviews of
the superannuation industry, is looking at ways to both increase consumer
demand and reduce supply-side constraints. With appropriate policy set-
tings, better policy coordination, and private–public collaboration, it may
be possible to resurrect the longevity insurance market without a need for
compulsory annuitization.
For such a small market, the Australian retirement income product
market commands extraordinary academic attention, perhaps because of
its unique position as the only retirement market in the English-speaking
world which operates in the context of a mandatory funded DC-type
second pillar. Analysis has included the effectiveness of the tax-transfer
provisions for retirement income products (Bateman et al. 1993; Bateman
and Kingston 2007; Bateman and Thorp 2008), money’s worth estimates
(Knox 2000; Doyle et al. 2004; Bateman and Ganegoda 2008), optimal
timing of annuitization (Kingston and Thorp 2005), and supply-side con-
straints in the annuity market (Purcal 2006). Brunner and Thorburn
(2008) provide an overview of the market for retirement income products.
Yet, no one predicted the collapse of the Australian life annuity market
over 2008–9.
The chapter does four things. First, we lay out the current state of
retirement policy in Australia. Second, we describe the retirement product
market in Australia and summarize trends by product type. We then relate
the supply and demand for these products to policy change and to changes
in longevity. It is clear that the market for life annuities, while small, has
been very responsive to changes in the regulatory environment.2 Finally, we
report current progress and suggest ways forward that may provide the
potential for a revival of the annuity market.
The Australian retirement income policy structure3
Australian retirement policy differs from that characterized by the proto-
typical OECD structure. It comprises a means-tested safety net; a manda-
tory, privately administered DC-type income replacement scheme (the
Superannuation Guarantee); and some additional concessions for further
retirement saving. Each of these components is described briefly.
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The Age Pension
Retirement provision in Australia relies heavily on an Age Pension,
financed from general revenue, which currently pays 27.7 percent of male
full-time earnings for a single pensioner, and 41.3 percent for a retiree
couple. Net replacement rates are higher as the Age Pension is exempt
from income tax, and payments are indexed to the greater of the growth of
the consumer price index (CPI), a pensioner and beneficiary living cost
index, and male average earnings, which ensures that it at least retains its
relativity to wages. Eligibility for the Age Pension brings with it access to
other benefits, including a pension supplement, a pensioner concession
card, a Health Card, and rent assistance.4 The access age is currently 65, but
following a review of public pensions in 2008–9, it will rise to 67 over the
period 2017–23 (Australian Government 2009; Harmer 2009).5
The Age Pension is available to all eligible residents regardless of work
history, but is means-tested. The means tests, applying to both income and
assets, have the effect of excluding the best-off quartile of age 65+ residents
from receiving pension benefits. Rather, more than half of this group
receives the full pension, with the remainder facing tapers on the means
tests which reduce their entitlement below the full pension level. The
income and assets tests are comprehensively defined, although the value
of the retiree’s owner-occupied home is excluded from the assets test. Until
recently, differential application of these tests to retirement assets and
benefits provided a mechanism for encouraging different types of retire-
ment benefit products.
One way of thinking about the Australian Age Pension is to view it as
a poverty alleviation instrument which excludes the rich, rather than a
safety net targeting the poor. It is still the major source of income for
most retirees, and along with the owner-occupied home, it is the major
asset with which they enter retirement.
The Superannuation Guarantee
The Age Pension is supplemented by a mandatory predominantly DC
retirement saving program. The minimum contribution rate is 9 percent
of earnings, payable by an employer, although the 9 percent is gross of taxes
and fees. Known as the Superannuation Guarantee (SG), this arrangement
was legislated in 1992, after a period of several years when a 3 percent pay-in
was negotiated through centralized bargaining arrangements.
The rationale behind the SG can be provided easily enough, although it
is unclear whether this rationale actually underpinned the policy initiative.
If an unfunded transfer is to be provided to the elderly to alleviate old-age
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poverty, then compulsory saving will go some way to correcting the result-
ing price distortion which might be expected to lead some to save less. This
idea, attributed initially to Hayek (1960) and elaborated elsewhere (e.g.,
Hubbard et al. 1995), has been formally incorporated into a mandatory
saving model by von Weizsaecker (2003).
The SG contribution rate was phased in over time, with the 9 percent pay-
in finally reached in 2002. Access age is 55, increasing to 60 for those born
after July 1964.6 It follows that for most of the 50 percent of employees
who enjoyed no superannuation entitlements before mandation, the SG
will not yield substantial lifetime income streams. It will be another twenty-
five years before full working life contributions will be available to retiring
cohorts.
Superannuation saving is subject to a complex tax regime. The tax treat-
ment of contributions differs by contribution type (e.g., employer, employee,
self-employed), with employee contributions generally paid out of after-tax
income and employer contributions generally tax deductible to employers,
but taxed as income in the hands of the superannuation (pension) fund.7
Superannuation fund earnings are taxed but at different rates depending on
the income type. Prior to the Simpler Super reforms of 2006–7, differential
tax treatment across retirement benefit products provided another mecha-
nism to encourage particular types of retirement income streams (Australian
Treasury 2006; Bateman andKingston2007). But all superannuationbenefits
taken after age 60 have been free of tax since July 2007.8 This last change has
meant that tax incentives toward income streams relative to lump sums, and
between different kinds of income streams, have almost disappeared for this
age group, although those retiring before age 60 will still face differential tax
rates depending on benefit type.
Voluntary retirement saving
Many people have more than 9 percent of earnings contributed to their
accounts, either because employers choose to make more than the mini-
mum contribution or because employees supplement the 9 percent with
contributions of their own. This may be thought of as voluntary employ-
ment-related saving. One of the advantages of the SG is that it has encour-
aged further voluntary saving of this type. Voluntary contributions are
encouraged by the overall concessional tax treatment of superannuation
saving, the government co-contribution scheme which provides a govern-
ment contribution of 150 percent of the employee or self-employed contri-
bution for low- and middle-income earners, and tax rebates for spouse and
child contributions.9 As well, some employees can take advantage of ‘salary
sacrifice’ arrangements under which their (employee) contributions are
treated as employer contributions for tax purposes (and are therefore
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subject to the 15 percent tax rate applying to employer contributions as
opposed to the contributor’s marginal tax rate).
While voluntary contributions on average amount to around 7 percent of
wages and salaries (Connolly 2007), their distribution is concentrated.
Survey data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) indicate that,
in 2007, only around 25 percent of superannuation fund members made
voluntary employee contributions, 13 percent of members made ‘salary
sacrifice’ contributions, and only 20 percent of those eligible made con-
tributions under the government co-contribution scheme (ABS 2009).
Voluntary retirement saving includes not only Superannuation but also
other forms of long-term saving through property, shares, managed invest-
ments, and, especially, homeownership. Homeownership is the most impor-
tant non-superannuation asset formost Australians. Owner-occupied housing
is worth more than half of the nation’s private wealth, and more than
80 percent of retirees own their homes (most of them with no mortgage).
These arrangements may be contextualized by reference to Figure 6.1,
which provides a schematic representation of the broad alternatives
of retirement saving policy and practice. The boxes on the left may be
thought of as three pillars of retirement provision policy, although defini-
tions vary. The alternatives in bold on the right side of the chart indicate
Australia’s policy choices. Using the taxonomy of Figure 6.1, the three
pillars of retirement income provision in Australia comprise the public
Age Pension (Pillar 1); mandatory superannuation under the SG (Pillar 2),
under which more than 95 percent of Australian employees are currently
covered; and voluntary superannuation and other long-term saving
through property, shares, and managed funds (Pillar 3). It is important
to note that there is neither compulsion nor incentive to take a retirement
benefit as an income stream, making Australia unique among those
countries relying principally on a mandatory DC plan to deliver income
replacement in retirement.
It is also important to appreciate the implications of the long lead
time required for a fully funded retirement saving scheme to have its full
impact. Current Superannuation accumulations for retirees are quite low,
particularly for women. In 2007, average superannuation balances totaled
$A87,589 for males and $A52,272 for females, with median balances signifi-
cantly lower at $A31,252 and $A18,489, respectively.10 While mean accu-
mulations are higher for those close to retirement, at $A164,679 for persons
aged 55–64, this is equivalent to only just over three times average male
earnings, and it is considerably higher than the median accumulation for
this age group of just $A71,731 (ABS 2009). As a result, around 75 percent
of Australians of eligible age receive some Age Pension, with around
60 percent of these paid at the full support rate.
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Retirement accumulations will increase and individual reliance on the
Age Pension will continue to fall over time as more retirees leave the
workforce with increasing more years of Superannuation coverage. Official
projections indicate that, between 2009 and 2050, the proportion of retir-
ees on the full Age Pension will fall from 42 to 28 percent (FaHCSIA 2008;
Harmer 2009). With the aging of the population, government estimates
suggest that the cost of the Age Pension will rise from 2.7 percent of GDP in
2009–10 to 3.9 percent of GDP over the same period (Australian Treasury
2010). This fiscal burden is quite modest by OECD standards, reflecting the
relatively low level of unfunded benefit payable, and the gradual encroach-
ment of funded support into the means-tested areas of the Age Pension.
The market for retirement income products
Pension payout structures from mandatory funded accumulations can take
many forms. In Australia, in the absence of mandatory annuities, retire-
ment benefits can be taken as one or a combination of a lump sum or a
retirement income stream.11 Retirement income streams currently avail-
able include term and lifetime immediate annuities, and account-based
SAFETY NET 
Universal 
Targeted 
INCOME 
REPLACEMENT 
(COMPULSORY) 
Publicly 
provided Funded 
Privately managed 
Publicly managed 
Publicly 
mandated 
VOLUNTARY 
SAVING 
Other 
Tax Preferred 
Non-tax preferred
(private saving) 
Employment Related 
PAYG 
Figure 6.1 Components of retirement income provision. Source : Authors’ deriva-
tions from Bateman et al. (2001).
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pensions which are a form of phased withdrawal product. As well, hybrid
products have been offered from time to time in response to regulatory
incentives.12 All retirement benefits are free of tax for persons aged 60 and
above and are equally subject to the Age Pension income and assets tests.
Annuities
Prior to the recent demise of the annuity market, a comprehensive menu
of immediate annuities had been available in Australia. These included
lifetime and fixed-term annuities offered on a nominal basis, or indexed,
single, or joint, and with the options of a guarantee period, reversion, and/
or a return of capital. In absolute terms, the market for annuities in
general, and life annuities in particular, was never large, but it has fluctu-
ated in response to policy change. In particular, the removal over 2006–7 of
the differential treatment by benefit type under the Age Pension means
tests and tax rules led to a severe deterioration of the Australian annuity
market. Notably, deferred annuities and variable annuities are now both
absent from Australia’s retirement income product menu.
Phased withdrawal products
Phased withdrawal products were first introduced in Australia in 1985 and
they are now the most popular form of retirement benefit. They were
previously provided as products called ‘allocated pensions’, and they are
currently marketed as ‘account-based pensions’ and ‘transition to retire-
ment pensions’. Both products allow retirees to invest their retirement
accumulations in an investment portfolio according to their risk prefer-
ences, and (subject to drawdown requirements) decide how much income
they want to draw down annually.13 Retirement benefits paid from an
account-based pension are tax-free for persons aged 60 and above,
and, where minimum age-based annual drawdowns are satisfied (as in
Table 6.1), the earnings on the underlying assets are also free of tax.
Transition to retirement pensions was introduced in 2005 with the aim of
encouraging partial rather than full withdrawal from the labor force. These
benefits are available to pre-retirees with a preservation age between 55 and
60 (i.e., those born on or after July 1, 1960) andmust be taken as an income
stream subject to a maximum annual drawdown of 10 percent of assets.
Hybrid products
Hybrid products have also arisen from time to time, largely in response to
tax-transfer incentives. These include ‘life expectancy’ term annuities,
which received regulatory sanction in 1998, where the term of annuity
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was required to be at least the life expectancy of the beneficiary, and ‘term
allocated pensions’ or TAPs. TAPs, also known as market-linked income
streams, were a form of variable annuity introduced in 2004 in response to
changes in the tax, Age Pension means test, and regulatory requirements.
They had a similar account structure to a phased withdrawal (then known
as an allocated pension), but a similar term structure to a life expectancy
term annuity (these are no longer marketed following reforms in 2007
which eliminated tax-transfer preference by benefit type).
Current retirement income product coverage
The take-up of the retirement income products available in Australia is
summarized in Tables 6.2 and 6.3. Table 6.2 reports aggregate coverage
by type of retirement benefit, while Table 6.3 provides disaggregation by
sex and age. From Table 6.2, it is clear that Australian retirees prefer
non-annuitized retirement benefits. In 2009, lump sums accounted for
48 percent of benefits paid, and account-based pensions (including transi-
tion to retirement pensions) just slightly more at around 95 percent of
the remaining 52 percent (or 49 percent) of benefits paid. Term annuities
accounted for just 5 percent of total income streams purchased (by assets),
while the take-up of life annuities was negligible with only seventeen
policies sold in the first nine months of 2009. Longer term trends are
discussed later.
Table 6.3 provides a disaggregated picture of retirement income product
coverage by sex and age. The columns in the left panel give estimates for all
people aged 55+; while the second and third panels increase the catchment
Table 6.1 Account-based pensions in Australia: minimum
drawdowns by age
Age (year) Percent of account
balance
< 65 4
65–74 5
75–79 6
80–84 7
85–89 9
90–94 11
95+ 14
Source: Supervision (2007).
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age to 60 and 65. These are important age brackets because of the varying
access ages operating in Australian retirement policy.
Nearly a quarter of Australia’s population is aged 55+; nearly 20 percent
is 60+; and 15 percent is 65+. Yet, only about half the 65+ group thinks of
itself as ‘retired’. Relatively few continue to work; most of the rest see
themselves in caregiving roles, or they do not regard themselves as having
had serious labor force attachment throughout their lives. At the risk of
some oversimplification, Age Pension support is assumed to begin at age
65, and about 75 percent of this group receives at least some Age Pension.14
For earlier age groups represented in Table 6.3, the major source of
transfer payment is the Disability Support Pension. This is increasingly
used as a means of accessing public support in the years immediately before
reaching Age Pension eligibility. More than half of Age Pension recipients
move to the Age Pension from some other support program.
The lower part of Table 6.3 provides data on private retirement income
recipients, drawn from income tax data. These are available from age 55
onward (for persons born before July 1960). At age 60 and above, about
32 percent of retirees enjoy these benefits, but as a proportion of popula-
tion, coverage is low. Only 17 percent of males aged 60+ have private
pensions and annuities, and only 15 percent of the age 65+ population
enjoys such access. However, many recipients of annuities and private
pensions will also receive some Age Pension. This is an intentional feature
of retirement income policy design.
Table 6.2 Private retirement benefits in Australia (2009)
Benefit type Coverage
Lump sum 48% of benefits paid
Income stream 52% of benefits paid
Private market for income stream products
Life annuity Negligible: 17 policies sold in the first nine months of 2009 (61
policies sold in 2008)
Term annuity 5% of market for income stream products
Account-based
pensiona
95% of market for income stream products
Superannuation
pensionb
NA
a Includes transition to retirement pensions.
b A superannuation pension is a lifetime pension provided from some defined benefits superannuation
funds. There is no publicly available information on the share of superannuation pensions.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Plan for Life Research (2010) and APRA (2010).
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Policy changes and patterns of demand and supply of
retirement income products
Economists since Yaari (1965) have argued that a consumer with no be-
quest motive should completely annuitize all wealth, yet annuities remain
very unpopular. Many explanations have been advanced for this puzzle,
including information asymmetry, crowding out, bequest motives, lack of
reinsurance opportunities, prudential capital requirements, or behavioral
reasons (Brown 2007; Agnew et al. 2008; Brown et al. 2008). Furthermore,
supply-side constraints such as a lack of products to hedge the long-term
liabilities and uncertainty surrounding mortality risk have made providers
reluctant to promote life annuities as a retirement benefit option (Purcal
2006).
In Australia, it is clear that demand for retirement income products
has been closely related to policy specification: taxation provisions, Age
Pension means-test rules (transfer provisions), and prudential supervision
decisions have all combined to generate the specific conditions to be met
by each product. And these have changed quite significantly over the past
twenty-five years. The evolution of these taxation, transfer, and regulatory
requirements is summarized in Table 6.4.
Throughout the 1980s, in conjunction with the introduction of manda-
tory DC arrangements, tax-transfer reforms were introduced to encourage
lifetime annuities. Measures included tax exemption for income on under-
lying assets; offering a 15 percent tax rebate, which, when compared
with the 15 percent tax then imposed on lump sums, gave a 30 percent
advantage to life annuity purchase;15 and a doubling of the retirement
accumulation eligible for tax concessions (known in Australia as the
Reasonable Benefit Limit) as compared with lump sums. Life annuities
were later afforded concessional treatment under the Age Pension income
and assets tests. However, almost as soon as they were introduced, these tax-
transfer incentives were progressively extended to non-longevity insured
products, including phased withdrawals (i.e., allocated pensions) from
1994, life expectancy term annuities from 1998, TAPs in 2004, and transi-
tion to retirement pensions in 2005. The ‘Simpler Super’ reforms of 2006–7
resulted in the removal of all tax-transfer preference by benefit type.
Figures 6.2 and 6.3 summarize trends in the take-up of retirement
income products purchased over this period. Figure 6.2 focuses on the
split between lump sums and retirement income streams, while Figure 6.3
reports on trends in the market for income stream products, specifically
life annuities, term annuities, account-based pensions, and TAPs.
Four trends are evident. First, the figures make clear the recent switch
in preference from lump sums to retirement income streams. Second,
they indicate a sharp increase in the demand for phased withdrawal-type
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Table 6.4 Evolution of the tax-transfer treatment of retirement benefits
Period Taxation of retirement
benefits
Age Pension means
test treatment of
retirement benefits
Product menu
Pre-
1983
Tax concessions for lump sums
(5% lump sum amount taxed
at personal tax rates). Full
taxation of retirement income
streams at personal tax rates.
Income and assets
from superannuation
benefits subject to full
income and assets
tests.
1983 Specific lump sum taxes
introduced (15/30).
First incentives for life
annuities
1984 Exemption from tax on
income of underlying assets of
immediate annuities.
1988 Significant changes to the
taxation of superannuation:
 Reduction in lump sum
taxes (0/15).
 15% annuity rebate for
immediate annuities.
 Return of capital excluded
from taxable income for
immediate annuities.
 Introduction of Reasonable
Benefit Limits (RBL), with
greater RBL for life
annuities.
1990 Concessions
introduced for lifetime
annuities.
 Full exemption from
assets test.
 Return of capital
excluded from
income assessed for
income test.
1992 Allocated pension
introduced (phased
withdrawal with
minimum and
maximum drawdown
requirements).
1994 15% annuity rebate for
allocated pensions.
1998 Age Pension means-
test concessions for
lifetime annuities
extended to life
expectancy annuities.
Concept of a life
expectancy term
annuity.
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products (allocated pensions, account-based pensions, and transition to
retirement pensions). Third, the figures show the growth and then decline
of the market for term annuities, and, finally, they illustrate the disappear-
ance of the small but robust market for life annuities.
Lump sums
Figure 6.2 plots the value of retirement benefits taken from Superannua-
tion funds each year from 1997 as either lump sums or income streams.
Traditionally, Australian retirees had a preference for non-annuitized ben-
efits and particularly lump sums: in 1997, income streams accounted
for only around 20 percent of retirement benefits taken (by assets). This
began to change with the introduction of phased withdrawal products,
initially in the form of allocated pensions, and later as ‘transition to
retirement pensions’ and ‘account-based pensions’. By 2009, for the first
time, income streams dominated lump sums and these income streams are
mostly account-based pensions.
Phased withdrawal products
Trends in the demand for account-based pensions (and allocated pen-
sions) are also reported in Figure 6.3. A small spike in sales is evident
in 1994 with the extension of the 15 percent annuity rebate to allocated
pensions, and a small dip prior to 2004 as retirees switched to term
annuities in anticipation of reduced Age Pension means-test preferences
2004 100% assets test
exemption reduced to
a 50% exemption and
extended to the new
term allocated pension
(TAP).
Term allocated
pension (TAP) – a
market-linked income
stream introduced.
2005 Transition to
retirement pension.
2007 Exemption from tax on all
retirement benefits for those
aged 60 and above (both lump
sums and income streams).
 Abolition of Reasonable
Benefit Limits.
 Abolition of 15% annuity
rebate.
Removal of assets test
exemption for
immediate annuities
and TAPs. Full asset
test applies to all
retirement benefits.
Account-based
pension (a revised
allocated pension with
a minimum drawdown
requirement only).
TAPs no longer sold.
Source : Authors’ calculations; see text.
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for these products from September 2004. But, the market for phased
withdrawal alternatives expanded rapidly from the mid-2000s. This can
almost certainly be attributed to the introduction of the Transition to
Retirement legislation of 2005 and the Simpler Super reforms of 2006–7.
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Figure 6.2 Value of retirement benefits: lump sum and income stream (1997–2008).
Source: Authors’ computations from APRA (2007, 2010).
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Figure 6.3 Value of private retirement income streams (1989–2008). Note : Account-
based pensions include transition to retirement pensions. Account-based pensions
were previously known as allocated pensions. Source: Authors’ representations of
data from Plan for Life Research (2010).
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The transition to retirement pensions allowed individuals to simulta-
neously contribute to a superannuation fund, continue to work, and draw
down benefits taken as an income stream. This allowed additional contri-
butions to be made from before-tax income (taxed at 15 percent in the
hands of the fund), and simultaneous tax-free withdrawals. The tax arbi-
trage advantages were obvious. Industry estimates indicate that about $A10
billion of the allocated pension market in 2007 can be attributed to this
policy mix (Plan for Life Research 2008). The Simpler Super reforms,
announced in the May 2006 Budget and implemented in 2006 and 2007,
abolished taxes on all retirement benefits taken after age 60, simplified the
Age Pension means tests by removing differences by benefit type, and
exempted tax on the underlying assets of retirement income streams
which satisfied minimum age-based drawdown requirements. As a result,
there are now incentives to keep retirement assets in the superannuation
system as a retirement income benefit, rather than take it out of the
superannuation system as a lump sum. In Australia, this has translated
into a rapid increase in the demand for account-based pensions.
Annuities
Prior to the introduction of mandatory accumulations, life annuities were
not offered as a marketed product. Yet, in response to tax incentives, a
small market for life annuities emerged in the 1980s; this grew slowly in the
1990s in line with advantageous tax arrangements. It reached its peak after
the introduction of Age Pension means-test incentives in 1998, in the form
of full asset test exemption and income test concessions. Life annuities
enjoyed a small niche in the retirement product marketplace until 2004,
when their exemption under the asset test was cut to 50 percent. Tax
concessions remained and supported a very small number of sales. Later
in the decade, after the removal of benefits taxation to retirees over the age
of 60 in 2007, all incentives for life annuities ceased (other than for those
retiring before age 60). Between 2007 and 2008, the market declined by
90 percent in value, and by two-thirds in terms of number of sales. In the
first three quarters of 2009, only seventeen life annuities were sold.
A similar pattern is seen for term annuities, with a gradual increase in
demand in line with the gradual extension of the incentives for life annuity
purchase to long-term annuities. This was followed by a contraction in
demand from 2004 with changes to the asset test and some decline after
the withdrawal of the tax-transfer concessions in 2007. The middle part
of the decade saw a small upsurge due to the introduction of the ‘hybrid’
TAP, but changes to means-test rules in 2007 effectively shut this market
down.
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – REVISES, 5/4/2011, SPi
Too Much Risk to Insure? The Australian (non-) Market for Annuities 95
Comp. by: PG2047 Stage : Revises1 ChapterID: 0001242101 Date:5/4/11
Time:23:14:18 Filepath:d:/womat-filecopy/0001242101.3D
T
a
b
le
6
.5
P
at
te
rn
s
o
f
an
n
u
it
y
p
u
rc
h
as
e
in
A
u
st
ra
li
a
(2
00
1–
9)
Ye
ar
T
er
m
ce
rt
ai
n
T
er
m
ce
rt
ai
n
w
it
h
R
C
V
L
if
et
im
e
an
n
u
it
ie
s
N
u
m
b
er
T
o
ta
l
va
lu
e
($
A
m
il
li
o
n
)
A
ve
ra
ge
va
lu
e
($
A
)
N
u
m
b
er
T
o
ta
l
va
lu
e
($
A
m
il
li
o
n
)
A
ve
ra
ge
va
lu
e
($
A
)
N
u
m
b
er
T
o
ta
l
va
lu
e
($
A
m
il
li
o
n
)
A
ve
ra
ge
va
lu
e
($
A
)
20
01
11
,0
72
79
4
71
,6
77
19
,7
25
1,
63
3
82
,7
99
1,
92
7
16
6
86
,2
27
20
02
15
,0
04
1,
09
6
73
,0
65
20
,3
26
1,
89
6
93
,2
96
1,
75
0
15
5
88
,3
49
20
03
18
,6
06
1,
35
6
72
,8
93
12
,5
30
1,
35
2
10
7,
92
5
1,
47
7
20
0
13
5,
67
4
20
04
37
,2
96
2,
75
8
73
,9
51
9,
15
9
1,
06
9
11
6,
73
1
2,
80
1
28
0
99
,8
86
20
05
7,
23
3
54
8
75
,7
46
7,
66
4
87
6
11
4,
30
7
29
3
27
93
,0
72
20
06
6,
56
6
53
1
80
,8
10
7,
18
7
94
6
13
1,
58
8
34
1
30
88
,4
46
20
07
7,
35
5
79
0
10
7,
35
3
6,
01
0
87
6
14
5,
74
9
40
3
37
92
,1
84
20
08
99
9
11
1
11
0,
95
1
5,
49
6
1,
00
6
18
2,
99
7
61
12
19
5,
08
2
20
09
47
5
51
10
7,
15
8
2,
53
6
46
6
18
3,
79
7
17
4
21
2,
35
3
N
ot
es
:
D
at
a
fo
r
20
09
co
ve
r
th
e
ye
ar
to
th
e
en
d
o
f
Se
p
te
m
b
er
o
n
ly
.
So
u
rc
e:
A
u
th
o
rs
’
ca
lc
u
la
ti
o
n
s
b
as
ed
o
n
P
la
n
fo
r
L
if
e
R
es
ea
rc
h
(2
01
0)
.
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – REVISES, 5/4/2011, SPi
Comp. by: PG2047 Stage : Revises1 ChapterID: 0001242101 Date:5/4/11
Time:23:14:18 Filepath:d:/womat-filecopy/0001242101.3D
Table 6.5 provides a more detailed breakdown of trends and patterns in the
annuity market. Purchase over this period was largely accounted for by term
annuities, which may be specified to pay back a percentage of the original
capital onexpiry of the contract, that is, with residual capital value (RCV).Many
of the short-term annuities specify an income of interest only, and 100 percent
return of capital at the end of the contract, while many of the longer term
annuities specify an income comprising both interest and capital. Over the
2001–9 period, short-term annuities were themost popular form of immediate
annuity purchased in Australia, relative to genuine longevity and long-term
annuities (life and life expectancy products).16 As illustrated in Table 6.5, of
32,722 immediate annuity policies sold in 2001 (worth $A2.59 billion), only
1,927 were life annuities and 11,702 were term annuities with no RCV. This
corresponds to purchase by only 2 percent of Australians retiring that year. By
2008, only 6,556 immediate annuity policies were sold (worth $A1.13 billion)
comprising only 999 term annuities with no RCV and 61 life annuities.
Coverage of retirement risks
From an economic standpoint, what is striking about retirement benefits in
Australia is not the response in demand for longevity-insured products to
changes in policy incentives. Instead, it is that almost no privately chosen
Superannuation benefits are longevity insured, no matter what the policy
in place. The increasingly popular account-based pensions, while ensuring
more provident use of accumulations than a lump sum payout, only offer
limited self-insurance against outliving one’s resources.
This limitation of phased withdrawals is well recognized, and some
analysts (e.g., Walliser 2000) have argued against their use in national DC
plans for this reason. Products missing from the Australian market include
variable life annuities, hybrid longevity products such as ruin-contingent
life annuities, and pooled annuity funds. The benefits of including pro-
ducts of this type on the retirement benefit product menu are clearly
illustrated in Mitchell et al. (2006) which assesses retirement income
products by coverage of retirement income risks.
Six possible designs for retirement benefit products are assessed as to
their degree of coverage of longevity, investment, and inflation risk in
retirement. The first three are products currently available in Australia. It
is clear that the most popular product – the account-based pension –
provides the least coverage against the main risks faced in retirement,
while the least popular product – the indexed life annuity – provides the
best coverage. Variable life annuities, hybrid longevity products, and
pooled annuity funds do not have a presence in the Australian market,
yet all three provide better coverage of the key retirement risks than
account-based pensions.
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Pooled annuity funds
We analyze first the pooled annuity funds or Group Self Annuitization
(GSA) products. These provide idiosyncratic risk pooling but leave system-
atic longevity risk with the annuitizing cohort, or bands of cohorts. Because
systematic longevity risk is not covered, organizations other than insurance
companies may offer these products. They therefore have potential value in
a structure such as Australia’s, where large accumulations sit in the individ-
ual accounts of those approaching retirement within Superannuation
funds – accumulations which the pension funds will lose to other insur-
ance-based organizations, absent some form of retirement product offer-
ing. While bilateral negotiation with insurance companies for more formal
longevity risk management products is possible and likely, offering this
kind of longevity insurance unilaterally has considerable appeal, without
the overhead and capital requirements faced by a licensed insurer. Pooled
annuity funds provide high coverage against longevity risk and investment
risk, and medium coverage against inflation risk.
Variable life annuity
The appeal of a variable life annuity is that it provides retirees discretion over
asset allocation and therefore does not require the annuitant to alter his
portfolio from whatever it was before retirement – property, equities, bonds –
to a portfolio of fixed income assets upon retirement. There is nothing in life
cycle theory to suggest that such an abrupt change in asset allocation is optimal,
or even sensible, which could be one reason for the lack of appeal of life
annuities. Current tax, transfer, and prudential regulations preclude the devel-
opment of an Australian market for variable annuities (e.g., an annuity with
variable payments is not considered an annuity for taxpurposes). An exception
was the TAP, a formof variable term annuity available in Australia from2004 to
2007, but this product fell short of providing full longevity insurance.
The standard variable life annuity is likely to provide high coverage
against longevity risk and medium coverage against inflation risk. Yet,
while the variable annuity product allows access to the returns of a diversi-
fied portfolio, the standard product did not insure against a prolonged
bear market. While payments may continue until death, they may become
vanishingly small, in other words exposing retirees to investment risk.
Hybrid longevity products
The most exciting recent product development is the evolution of variable
annuities, which in the United States have beenmainly investment vehicles,
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to embrace a minimum guarantee for life – characterized as hybrid longev-
ity products. Essentially, these products operate as a special type of de-
ferred annuity added to the standard variable annuity, which cuts in not at
a prespecified date but in the event that a particular account has been
exhausted, either because of market conditions or longevity. As developed
by Huang et al. (2009), these ruin-contingency life annuities provide pay-
ment contingent on survival.17
In the Australian context, this may be thought of as an account-based
pension coupled with a wealth-depletion-triggered deferred annuity. To
make these worthwhile, the deferred annuity must operate with no surren-
der value, or RCV, should the holder die before they come into payment.
The survivor bonus component is an important piece of the insurance
payoff.18 Such a product is more economical than a standard deferred
annuity advocated elsewhere.19 It may not be needed at all if the market
remains strong throughout the life of the individual, and its pricing takes
this into account.
While there has been product development along these lines in Austra-
lia, it has not been possible to offer an exact copy of the overseas products
due to particular regulatory provisions in the Australian market. In late
2009, ING launched a product called ‘MoneyforLife’ which is essentially an
account-based pension with guaranteed minimum lifetime payments. The
product is designed to provide insurance against longevity risk and invest-
ment risk, and since it is ‘account-based’ rather than a life annuity, the full
value of the product passes to the estate in the event of the product
holder’s death.20
Similar products are under development by other financial service pro-
viders, but all have been constrained by legislative provisions relating to
the taxation, Age Pension means tests, prudential regulation, and capital
adequacy, which require coordination with as many as five different gov-
ernment agencies. Each of these agencies acts in what it sees as a responsi-
ble fashion in light of its own mandate, but the overall effect may well be
to effectively ban an appealing longevity insurance product. What is need-
ed is a coordinated approach to the regulations and policies impacting
on retirement income products, so that greater longevity insurance is
encouraged.
Further development of the limited Australian retirement income prod-
uct market is also constrained by a number of additional barriers including
the sparse availability of assets to hedge liabilities associated with life
annuities, uncertainties surrounding mortality risk, distribution channels
which have been dominated by financial service providers who can make
more money selling investment products (even if these are inappropriate),
and possibly behavioral biases which lead consumers to make suboptimal
decisions (see Agnew et al. 2008; Brown et al. 2008).
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The way forward: market potential, product risk
sharing, and public–private partnerships
On the face of it, the picture painted here is a bleak one in terms of
encouraging longevity insurance. Nevertheless, the Australian market is
starting to develop new longevity insurance products which appear to
have greater consumer appeal, and which have been selling well in the
United States. There is also potential for improvement in policy settings
and practice which would significantly expand the longevity insurance
market in Australia, although significant reform would be required to
achieve this. Properly executed, these may well obviate the need for com-
pulsory annuitization, a course which other nations have considered.
Yet, there are several prerequisites. First, the current policy process with
regard to privately offered longevity insurance products must be better
coordinated. Several public entities, including the Australian Taxation
Office (ATO), the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA),
the Department of Family, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous
Affairs (FaHCSIA), and the Australian Treasury, are influential in creating
market opportunities for longevity insurance products. Yet none have the
development of this market as among their primary policy goals. Neither is
there any meaningful communication between them regarding assessment
of proposed products. At the very least, a mechanism to contextualize and
coordinate responses to market innovation is required, to provide private
sector insurers with a firm basis for product development.
Second, much more sophisticated distribution channels are required for
the promotion and sale of longevity insurance products. Most people
approaching retirement at present seek the advice of a financial advisor,
who in many cases may be naive about longevity risk, and who often is
motivated by commission incentives built around investment-style pro-
ducts. A possible mechanism for breaking through this lies with the large
Superannuation funds, which do have a relationship with their members.
The not-for-profit funds especially, which account for a large proportion of
the workforce, may have the capacity to harness their relationships to
promote products embracing greater longevity insurance than is presently
the case. Other policy suggestions such as limiting commission payments to
financial planners may help with increasing net returns, but they seem
unlikely on their own to address the retirement protection issue.
Additional policy initiatives may also be considered. Government could
also enter the annuity market directly alongside private insurers, to ‘kick-
start’ the market, as has been raised during consultations surrounding the
2007–8 Henry Review of the Australian taxation system. One proposal – the
use of relatively small accumulations (because the SG is not yet mature, SG
accumulations are frequently small) to ‘top up’ the Age Pension through a
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government agency – has considerable political appeal. More immediately,
Government debt could be issued in forms which provide natural hedges
against longevity (and interest and inflation) risk, essentially allowing
insurers to partially immunize their annuity exposure. For example, the
issue of long-duration, inflation-indexed bonds would offer an immediate
hedge for CPI-indexed annuities.
Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed the parlous state of the market for life annuities
in Australia. Australians have traditionally favored non-annuitized retire-
ment benefits, and the market for life annuities has never been large. But,
following the withdrawal of tax-transfer incentives for life annuity purchase
over 2006–7, the market has all but disappeared and the large increase in
retirement benefit products is accounted for solely by phased withdrawal-
type products (or account-based pensions in Australia). Fewer than twenty
life annuities were sold in Australia in all of 2009. The increasing trend to
take phased withdrawal products thus leaves Australian retirees exposed to
longevity risk, and Australia as the only country relying predominantly on
private mandatory DC accounts not to have incentives or mandates in place
for longevity insurance.
Poor coordination between key government policy departments deserves
part of the blame for the demise of the market for life annuities. But
previous growth and a resurgence of the annuities market has been con-
strained by supply-side factors. These include the absence of assets to
hedge the liabilities associated with life annuities, uncertainties surround-
ing mortality risks, and possibly the nature of the distribution channels
which have been dominated by financial service providers who can make
more money selling investment products.
In any event, there is cause for optimism, with some formative steps
toward a revitalized market for longevity insurance products. The Austra-
lian wealth management industry is actively developing new longevity
products of the ruin-contingent variety, while the government, in response
to recent reviews of the superannuation industry (AFTS 2009), is looking at
ways to both increase consumer demand and reduce supply-side con-
straints for life annuities. Options canvassed include the issue of long-
duration inflation-indexed bonds, and collaboration between the public
and private sectors in the offering of longevity products. With appropriate
policy settings, better policy coordination, and private–public collabora-
tion, it may be possible to resurrect Australia’s longevity insurance market
without the need for compulsory annuitization.
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Notes
1 Withdrawal at age 60 applies for persons born on or after July 1, 1964. The
withdrawal age is 55 for persons born before July 1, 1960, and progressively
increases from 55 to 60 for persons born between 1960 and 1964.
2 The regulatory environment refers to the tax and Age Pension means-test
provisions and the prudential regulations.
3 The discussion of the Australian retirement income arrangements draws on
Bateman et al. (2001) and Bateman (2010).
4 The pension supplement was introduced in 2008. It combines the previous pharma-
ceutical allowance, utilities allowance, GST supplement, and telephone allowance.
5 The Age Pension age for females is being gradually increased from age 60 to age
65 by 2014. Between 2017 and 2023, the Age Pension age will increase to 67 for
both males and females (see Australian Government 2009).
6 Under the phase-in arrangements, the preservation age for those born before
July 1, 1960 remains at 55, then it increases one year at a time, reaching age 60
for those born after June 30, 1964.
7 Employee contributions are not tax deductible but may be eligible for tax
concessions or government co-contributions. Contributions by the self-em-
ployed are tax deductible and from July 2006 will be eligible for the government
co-contribution.
8 This only applies where the Superannuation has been accumulated in a ‘taxed’
fund, which is the most common case. As well, earnings on assets underlying
Superannuation income streams are untaxed where legislated minimum draw-
downs apply. Benefits taken prior to age 60 remain subject to tax.
9 As a consequence of fiscal restraint during the recent global financial crisis,
the Superannuation co-contribution matching rate was reduced from 150 to 100
percent for contributions made in 2009–12 and to 125 percent for contributions
made for 2012–14.
10 The exchange rate as of 2010 was $A1 = $US1.133 (Oanda 2010).
11 For example, term allocated pensions (known as TAPs) were a form of market-
linked income stream offered between 2004 and 2007 in response to preferable tax
and Age Pension means-test provisions. TAPs had a similar account structure to
allocated pensions, but a term structure also to an annuity with a term equal to life
expectancy.
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12 As well, some defined benefit pension plans offer superannuation pensions.
13 The previous allocated pension product had both a minimum and a maximum
drawdown requirement.
14 Table 6.3 shows 71.4 percent. The difference is due to Service Pensions (which
are equivalent to an Age Pension but paid to returned servicemen).
15 The treatment of the principal repayment component of life annuities pur-
chased with tax-preferred accumulations nullified this advantage (Bateman
et al. 1993).
16 Short-term annuities are an attractive and tax-preferred means of preserving
superannuation accumulations between preservation age and actual retirement.
17 Related products are discussed in Kingston and Thorp (2005) and Horneff et al.
(2010).
18 Huang et al. (2009) suggest that such a deferred annuity could be offered as
a separate product, which they term a Ruin Contingent Life Annuity (RCLA).
19 For example, see Bateman et al. (2001).
20 For details on the ING ‘MoneyforLife’ product, see http://www.ing.com.au/
personal/retirement/ing-moneyforlife.aspx
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